Mahala E. Lawlor v. R. Keith Lawlor : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1951
Mahala E. Lawlor v. R. Keith Lawlor : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Harvey A. Sjostrom; Attorney for defendant and appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Lawlor v. Lawlor, No. 7742 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1607
7742 
In the Supreme· Court 
of the State of Utah 
jJAHALA E. LAWLOR, 
· Plaintiff af'Kl Respondent . APPELLANTS 
vs BRIEF 
R. KEITH LAWLOR,. Case No. 77 42 
Defendant and .Appellant 
Appeal from the District Court of Cache County. Utah 
Honorable Lewis Jones. District Judge 
F J L E ~rvey A. Sjostrom 
U Attorney for defendant 
· NOV 10 1~51 
., and appellant 
·f .... IIJI'II•--------------------------·----------
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Index to Argument 
Index to Cases Cited 
Statement of Facts . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . .. ..... .......... ... 1 
Statement of Points . . ... . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . .. . .. . .. . .. 3 
Argument .............................................. . 
Conclusion 
. ................................ 7 
------··························· 20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX TO POINTS IN ARGUMENT 
Point No. 1. The Court erred in its finding No. 4 of its 
finding of fact that defendant and appellant contributed very 
little to the support of the family since the parties marriage 
and that plaintiff had supported defendant and their son 
since their marriage ---------------------------------------------------------------- 6-9 
Point No. 2. The Court erred in finding No. 5 of its 
finding of fact that appellant was but partially disabled and 
in not finding him totally disabled, and erred also in finding 
that since 1942 appellant had earned but $2000.00 in addition 
to his pension and that same had been mostly used for his 
own expenses ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6-9 
Point No. 3. The Court erred in its finding No. 6 and 
ev.ery part thereof in finding that defendant had been intox-
icated on various occasions and precipated quarrels with 
respondent and that he had struck her both in public and 
in private causing her great mental distress and causing 
her to lose her love for him ---------------------------------------------------- 9-14 
Point No. 4. The Court erred in its finding No. 7 in 
finding that said facts as found in No. 6 of its findings, had 
caused her, the plaintiff, great mental and physical distress 
and nervousness ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9-14 
Point No. 5. The Court erred in that part of finding 
No.8 which found the Plymouth car worth the sum of $500.00. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 15-16 
Point No. 6. The Court erred in its finding No. 10 and 
every part thereof in finding that the defendant must deposit 
the sum of $5000.00 with the Clerk of the Court if he should 
d-esire the house and lot in the event he did not the home 
should go to the plaintiff and in failing to make the sum 
of $2500.00 or less if he should want the home ________________ 15-16 
Point No. 7. The Court erred in its finding No. 11 that 
plaintiff had not been cruel toward the defendant in any 
respect ------------------------- ____ _____ ____________ ___________ _____________ ___ ___ ______ ___ __ _ 9-14 
Point No. 8. The Court erred in its finding No. 12 that 
all of the allegations of the complaint are true while those 
of the answer and counter claim are untrue -------------------- 9-14 
Point No. 9. The Court erred in making its finding No. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 of its supplemental finding that there were grounds for 
condonation of the plaintiff toward the defendant but if there 
was then the Court erred in finding that defendant had viol-
ated the terms of condonation in drinking and not providing 
himself with a job ---------------------------------------------------------------- 16-17 
Point No. 10. The Court erred in its conclusion of law 
No. I. that plaintiH is entitled to a decree of divorce against 
the defendant and in not concluding that defendant was 
entitled to a decree of divorce against plaintiff ________________ 17-20 
Point No. 11. The Court erred in its conclusion of law 
No. 4 that unless the defendant deposited the sum of $5000.00 
with the Clerk of the Court by a certain time the plaintiff 
was entitled to have the home awarded to her and in not 
making the sum of $2500.00 or less as a condition of defend-
ant acquiring home ------------------------------------------------------------ 17-20 
Point No. 12. The Court erred in awarding the plaintiff 
a decree of divorce against the defendant and appellant 
as set forth in paragraph 1 and 2 thereof ------------------------ 17-20 
Point No. 13. The Court erred in its decree of divorce 
in awarding the home and lot of the parties to the plaintiff 
and repsondent as set forth in paragraph No. 6 thereof, and 
in not awarding the defendant the same upon the payment 
of $2500.00 by defendant and in further finding that defend-
ant had made an election not to take the home as he had 
done no affirmative ad one way or the other to indicate 
that -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17-20 
Point No. 14. The Court erred in its decree of divorce 
in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant that he must 
remove himself and personal effects by a certain time from 
said home and in case he did not that a writ of possession 
would be issued by the Court and defendant ousted as set 
in paragraphs 7 and 8 of said decree-------------------------------- 17-20 
INDEX TO CASES OR AUTHORITIES CITED 
Am. Jur. Vol. 17, pp 178, sec. 55 ------------------------------------------ _____ 12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
~fAHAL~-\ E. LAWLOR, 
Plaint·iff and Respondent 
vs 
R. KEITH LAWLOR, 
Defendant and Appellant 
APPELLANTS 
BRIEF 
Case No. 77 42 
STATEMENT OFF ACT 
~I ahala E. Lawlor filed suit against her husband, 
R. ICeith Lawlor, for divorce. She alleged in her com-
plaint, an10ng other things, that said defendant had 
treated her cruelly, causing her great mental distress. 
She failed to allege the value of a lot and house owned 
by the parties, but alleged the value of certain bonds 
(Canadian) at $1340.00, a 1938 Plymouth car at $500.00 
and household furniture at $200.00 belonging to both 
parties and other household goods belonging to her 
exclusively with no allegation of value. She prayed for 
divorce and $150.00 attorney fees as against defendant 
and a reasonable property settlement. (pp. 1) The 
defendant answered and put in a counterclaim denying 
the cruelty but alleging if true there was condonation. 
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He alleged cruelly on plaintiff's part causing him great 
mental distress. He further alleged plaintiff had no· 
interest in said Canadian bonds, that the car was worth 
not more than $300.00, that he was 100% totally disabled 
and was now unable to make a proper living for him-
self; that plaintiff was of full health and vigor and 
making about $135.00 per month. He prayed plaintiff's 
action be dismissed and that divorce be given him to-
gether with real property and that inasmuch as plain-
tiff had taken all Canadian bonds that she be made 
to give him $250.00 so he could pay his attorney (pp. 5). 
Plaintiff filed her reply alleging that 1/5 of said bonds 
belonged to her, denied the cruelty alleged by defend-
ant, admitted defendant's disability, employment of 
plaintiff, possession of said bonds, alleged that defend-
ant has contributed very little to support of family and 
among other things enlarging on defendant's cruelty. 
She further alleged house and lot was worth approx-
imately $2500.00 (pp. 7). 
The Court granted the plaintiff a divorce but prior 
thereto Inade an interlocutory order (pp 10) to the ef-
fect that if defendant desired house and lot he deposit 
wih the Clerk of the Court $5000.00 by July 9th, 1951 
and if it be not so deposited as payment to the plaintiff 
then the said property shall be awarded to plaintiff. 
together with other property (pp. 16). 
We further find the facts to be that plaintiff in all 
these years of married life had by her own testimony 
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llE'Yer brought up the subject of divorce, not even once 
(tr. -16, ;)3 )that she further testified that defendant 
had done all he could do under his physical handicaps 
and that he wa~ so handicapped when she married hiin 
about 20 years ago ( tr. 40) through service in World 
\r ar 1 and that she knew that defendant had been badly 
shot-up and shell shocked (tr. 51). However, as stated 
plaintiff admitted that defendant had done all he could 
to 1nake a living and that when he was turned down 
in his applications for jobs because of his physical hand-
icaps he 1nade public issue of the matter in the news-
paper (tr. 47, 48). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH 
APPELLANT INTENDS TO RELY FOR REVERSAL 
OF JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
Point No. 1. The Court erred in its finding No. 4 
of its finding of fact that defendant and appellant 
contributed very little to the support of the family since 
the , parties marriage and that plaintiff had supported 
defendant and their son since their marriage. 
Point No. 2. The Court erred in finding No. 5 of 
its finding of fact that appellant was but partially 
disabled and in not finding him totally disabled, and 
erred also in finding that since 1942 appellant had 
earned but $2000.00 in addition to his pension and that 
same had been mostly used for his own expenses. 
Point No. 3. The Court erred in its finding No. 6 
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and every part thereof in· finding that the defendant 
been intoxicated on various occasions and precipated 
quarrels with respondent and that he had struck her both 
in public and private causing her great 1nental distress 
and causing her to lose her love for him. 
Point No. 4. The Court erred in its finding No. 7 
in finding that said facts as found in No. 6 of its find-
ings, had caused her, the plaintiff, great mental and 
physical distress and nervousness. 
Point No; 5. The Court erred in that part of find-
ing No. 8 which found Plymouth car worth the sum of 
$500.00. 
Point No. 6. The Court erred in its finding No. 10 
and every part thereof in finding that the defendant 
must deposit the sum of $5000.00 with the Clerk of the 
Court if he should desire the house and lot and in the 
evel'lt he did not the home should go to the plaintiff and 
in failing to make the sum of $2500.00 or less if he 
should want the home. 
Point No. 7. The Court erred in its finding No. 
11 that plaintiff had not been cruel toward the defend-
ant in any respect. 
Point No. 8. The Court erred in its finding No. 12 
that all of the allegations of the cmnplaint are true 
while those of the answer and counterclain1 are untrue. 
Point No. 9. The Court erred in making its finding 
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N"o. 13 of ih~ ~npple1nental finding that then• were 
grounds for condonation of the plaintitf toward the 
defendant but if there was, then the Court erred in find-
ing that defendant had violated the tenns of condona-
tion in drinking· and not providing himself with a job. 
Point No. 10. The Court erred in its conclusion 
of law no. 1, that plaintiff is entitled to a decree of di-
Yorce against the defendant and appellant, and in not 
concluding that defendant was entitled to a decree of 
divorce against the plaintiff. 
Point No. 11. The Court erred in its conclusion of 
law No. 4 that unless the defendant deposited the sum 
of 5000.00 with the Clerk of the Court by a certain time 
the plaintiff was entitled to have the home awarded to 
her and in not 1naking the smn of $2500.00 or less as a 
condition of defendant acquiring home. 
Point No. 12. The Court erred in awarding the 
plaintiff a decree of divorce against the defendant and 
appellant as set forth in paragraph 1 and 2 thereof and 
In not awarding said decree to defendant. 
Point No. 13. The Court erred in its decree of di-
vorce in awarding the hmne and lot of the parties to the 
plaintiff and respondent as set forth in paragraph No. 
6 thereof, and in not awarding the defendant the same 
upon the payment of $2500.00 by defendant and in fur-
ther finding that defendant had made an election not to 
take the home as he had done no affirmative act one way 
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or the other to indicate that. 
Point No. 14. The Court erred in its decree of di-
vorce in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant 
that he must remove himself and personal effects by 
a certain time from said home and in case he did not that 
a writ of possession would be issued by the Court and 
defendant ousted as set forth in paragraphs 7 and 8 of 
said decree. 
ARGUMENT 
Points No. 1 and 2 
Point No. 1 and 2 cover the findings contained in 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Court that defendant con-
tributed but very little to the support of the family and 
that defendant made but $2000.00 from the year 1942 
until the divorce complaint was filed in addition to 
the pension that he received for his injuries suffered 
in the 1st World War and that he is only partially 
disabled. (pp. 11, 12) The defendant testified that 
he made approximately the sum of $16000.00 since com-
ing to Logan (tr. 176) including pensions. The plaintiff 
herself admitted that defendant had done all he could 
under •his physical handicaps and conditions (tr. 48) 
and that he even went so far in order to obtain work 
to make a public issue of it in the newspaper (tr. 47) 
and that he then got work. What more can be asked 
of defendant~ 
That he is totally disabled is admitted in the plead-
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ings of the plaintiff. It will be noticed that in· pai·a-
graph -! of onr counterclaim we allege 100 per ·cent 
total disability. (p 6) In par.agraph 6 of plaintiff's 
reply (pp. 7) plaintiff admits that "defendant is dis-
abled.'· From this we have a right to assume an ad-
Inission of 100 per cent disability under sub-paragraph 
b of Rule 8 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure which says 
on page 11 ''that denials shall fairly meet the substance 
of the averments denied". The fact that plaintiff 
denies the remainder of paragraph four, we believe, 
cannot be said to apply to said allegation of 100 per cent 
disability, but to other averment in said paragraph 4 
of our counter-claim. 
That defendant placed money in bank made by him 
In both of parties names (tr. 57) is not denied and 
plaintiff drew on same by own admission. When asked 
if she had placed money in said account she said occas-
ionally, but she could produce no receipts ( tr. 37) and 
it will be observed plaintiff was exceedingly evasive in 
her answers on this subject ( tr. 37). Plaintiff admitted 
that the last income tax that she paid she drew on the 
joint bank account of the parties ( tr. 39). If defendant 
had only made $2000.00 since 1942 as the Court found 
it is most peculiar that defendant should have an account 
at all for he would have an average income of only 
$200.00 per year.· Plaintiff further testified she wrote 
no checks out without appellant's consent and she did 
so in paying the income tax of the parties last year. 
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(tr, 39) 'rhis would certainly.seem to indicate that ap-
pelant was really making a substantial contribution to 
the family. in spite of his many handicaps and that he 
was the only one placing his income in the joint ac-
count, otherwise, why would respondent mention to him 
about writing checks on said account. In conclusion 
on these points and as having reference to the division 
of the property made by the Court in the decree, we 
maintain it is inequitable for it gave to plaintiff in the 
neighborhood of $6000.00 and appellant about $1350.00. 
In this connection it will be noted that as defendant 
said he had 1natched the plaintiff dollar for dollar 
in what he 1nade during their married life about 
$16,000.00 (tr. 176) and when I as defendant's counsel 
sought to elicit the items that went to 1nake up this sum 
the Court said, ''he testified he earned $16,000.00 Mr. 
Sjostrom, why don't you let him cross-exa1nine ( tr. 177) 
to which writer consented. But strange to say counsel 
for plaintiff found it inadvisable to go into the various 
sources of defendant's inc01ne. One thing more: Plain-
tiff was questioned by defendant's counsel if defendant 
had ever asked her to go to work. 
_..\. Well, in actions, yes. 
Q. That's the way you want to answer the question? 
A. When I'm hungry I would have sense enough 
to go to work, so I guess I would answer yes in a case 
of that kind (tr. 50). 
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This is indeed a strange answer in view· of the fact 
that the parties had Canadian ·bonds of the face value 
of $1340.00 ( tr. 55) and which defendant had· received 
in lieu of taking his pension check of $25.00 per n1onth. 
That being undisputed it tnust be assun1ed that the 
income of the parties was easily sufficient to take 
care of living expenses and to which defendant testified 
that he contributed as much as plaintiff . 
.ARGUMENT 
Points 3, 4, 7 and 8 
Points 3 and 4 take up findings of 6 and 7 (pp. 12) · 
of the Court which in substance say that the defendant 
had treated plaintiff cruelly causing her great distress. 
Points 7 and 8 take up the findings of the Court in 
paragraphs 11 and 12 (pp. 13) to the effect respectively 
that plaintiff has not been cruel to defendant and that 
all of the allegation of the complaint are true while 
those of the answer and counter-claim of the defendant 
are untrue. First as to the findings of the Court under 
points 3 and 4 (finding 6 and 7) and then points 7 and 
8 as it seems that it would be better, to a more clear 
understanding of these findings ,by discussing them to-
gether in the order indicated. 
It will be observed that plaintiff testified that in 
1939 after a visit to "Mitch and Sallies", that defend-
ant beat up on her so as to confine her to bed for 3 days 
(tr. 14) but in regard to this matter defendant testified 
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that they had been drinking and that 'he slapped her 
after her giving him a shove ( tr. 98') and that she w~s 
up the next morning. It is peculiar indeed ·that he 
could put her in bed for 3 days yet there is no testimony 
that a doctor or police were called. (In as much as 
this is an equity case this Court has the right to make 
such findings as to the truth of alleged· matters and 
findings as to them the evidence warrants.) That she 
should wait for 1~ years to bring up this matter is also 
indeed peculiar. She further testified that he slapped 
her for buying a pair of shoes 3 or 4 years after their 
marriage (tr. 39) (16 years ago), but he denies this 
and says that she had purchased gloves that were too 
large for him ( tr. 98) and there was no slapping that 
he merely chided her; that he never threw her against 
the bathtub or sink as she testified (tr. 99) nor did he 
ever threaten her with butcher knives (tr. 99); and that 
all there was to the knife incident was that he and the 
boys at a party in his fome had been sticking knives 
in a hat and a cabinet and she became angry at the 
incident as they were passing the "buck" as to who 
actually did it, (tr. 99, 100) when she tried to find the 
guilty party. 
As to plaintiff's cruelty to defendant we believe 
there is real substantial ground to believe it true. That 
she went to Al Larsen's and told him not to let her 
husband have any guns is not denied because of his 
alleged instability, according to her (tr. 139, 170) yet 
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at the same thne she testified that she let the guns that 
defendant -kept in their hon1e out for cleaning only 
(tr· 170) and for no other purpose; that she left all 
the butcher knives at their home ( tr. 171) and she knew 
he could get guns and ammunition elsewhere (tr. 171, 
172) So it is our opinion that she wanted his friends 
to turn away from him so he would leave for Canada 
where she wanted hin1 so n1uch to go. ( tr. 171) Defend-
ant further testified that plaintiff had on numerous 
occasions called his afflictions to his attention compar-
ing him with the salesman that she was in the habit 
of seeing (tr. 96); that he wanted the boy to go to college 
but she wouldn't let him and also turned the boy against 
him (tr. 96); that she would stay out at night until 
3 in the morning then come in with liquor on her breath 
(tr. 97); that she insisted on keeping all the obscene 
exhibits in the house though he pleaded with her to get 
rid of them, ( tr. 104, 108 exhibit 1, 2, 3, 4, 4, 5, 6,) but 
he received nothing in return but a tirade from her; 
that she kissed and hugged other men (tr. 132) whicl:_ 
she did not deny. That plaintiff never put any money 
in their joint bank account since coming to Logan as he 
had (tr. 94) and she never told him what her salary was 
(tr. 94). 
We have the most conclusive exhibits in this cause 
that shows the character of the plaintiff and for which 
keeping she was subject to a court action-it being a 
misdemeaner to have such exhibits. We are unable to 
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bring ourselves to a point that anything that defendant 
did could have affected her in any undesirable way tak-
ing her testirnony as being true· But we say with the 
exception of the admitted slap he treated her in a most 
proper way. And it rnay be said further, in connection 
with her charge of cruelty, why did she not bring cor-
roborating witness in such rnatters, they were readily 
at hand and particularly her friend Johnson. 
A person insisting on keeping the exhibits some of 
which are, in her own handwriting, as here shown to have 
been harbored and treasured by plaintiff even after re-
quests by her husband to get rid of it depicts, to our 
way of thinking, a person not steeped in the normal re-
finements of life but the opposite and to really injure 
such a person a party would indeed have to go to the 
extrerne. And no such injury or cruelty is shown by 
plaintiff even if all she testified to is true which we do 
not adrnit. If what we say here is true and we add to 
this her intoxication in the small hours of the mornin:.; 
and her calling defendant's and appellant's attention to 
his physical handicaps which he certainly was in no 
way to blame for and her kissing and hugging other 
rnen, we urge that respondent has not made out a case 
of legal cruelty against appellant. For as is said in 
Am. J ur. Vol. 17 pp. 178, sec. 55 on divorce: 
"While rnere incompatibility of temperament is 
not itself grounds for divorce, it is well recog-
nized, especially in the modern cases, that the 
jury, or the court sitting as a trier of the facts, 
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in deter1nining whether the circumstances show 
cruelty, should always keep in view the intelli-
gence. apparent refine1nent, and delicacy of sent-
iment of the cmuplaining party. These facts, 
of course, Inay tend either to strengthen or \Veak-
en the case n1ade for there 1nay be cases in which 
1nere blows should not be considered cruelty·. 
These Inay be given, but still there may be strong 
affection between the parties. Among persons 
of coarse habits they might pass for very little 
more than rudeness of language or manner. They 
1night occasion no apprehension and be produc-
tive of only slight unhappiness. As strongly 
expressed by one court: "It is not all unlawful 
and barbarous acts that are made grounds of 
divorec· We do not divorce savages and barbar-
ians because they act as such towards each 
other.'' 
In paragraphs 11 and 12 (points 8 and 9) the Court 
finds that plaintiff has not been cruel to defendant in 
any respect and all allegations of complaint are true 
while those of the answer and counterclaim are untrue 
as above mentioned. 
We believe we have shown in the forgoing discussion 
that plaintiff was cruel to defendant and that the allega-
tion of the complaint were untrue and that the answer 
and counterclaim are true. In this connection, as 
going to plaintiff's credility 1n a y we further 
point out that in plaintiff's reply she a II e g e s 
the home to be worth $2500.00 ( pp. 9) and testified 
to same an1ount ( tr. 52) yet the Court finds the home 
to be worth $5000.00 (pp. 13) the amount which appel-
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lant testified to as being its approximate value to him 
for therapy purposes ( tr. 1333) Also, the Court finds 
the Ply1nouth car, which was awarded to defendant worth 
$500.00 (pp 13) when in open court defendant offered 
her the car for $200.00 (tr. 53) and further offered to 
give her $2500.00 for the home, (tr. 57, 8) which was re-
fused. 
It is only fair to assume from the evidence that 
the plaintiff has found her "salesman" that she so 
often spoke about and so often compared to the de-
fendant who was getting along in years and that she 
might as well drop him for another and evidently started 
laying her plans months before trial, for it will he 
noted defendant testified: ''She complained about being 
the only bread winner of the home. Claims all sundry 
bringing home the groceries. I've wanted to go down 
and help her with the groceries for the last six months 
and it seemed funny now that this thing comes up. She 
doesn't want me around the store (meaning the store 
in Logan where she worked) neither does she want me 
to haul her around in the car with them. She'll lug 
the big packages across the square and complain that 
they hurt her. I said "you don't have to do that (tr. 
94) There was no denial of this. And we must re-
nlember that there are $1340.00 (face value) of Canadian 
bonds that could be used. 
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ARGUMENT 
Points 5 and 6 
\V e believe point No. 5 is taken care of and cover-
ed in our discussion points 7 and 8 (findings 11 and 12) 
and will add but little to it- The Court found in its 
finding No. 8 that the hon1e was worth the sum of 
$5000.00 and the Plymouth car the su1n of $500.00. As 
stated before we offered to let plaintiff have the car 
for $200.00 in open Court but she refused it and further 
offered her $2500.00 for the home the sum she testi-
fied and alleged it was worth. It is true that defend-
ant said that the home was worth the sum of approx-
miately $4800.00 to him because he needed it for his 
therapy purposes (tr. 133) Yet the Court below found 
both the allegations and testimony of the plaintiff as 
to this property untrue and then in findings N o.10 (point 
No. 6) said that defendant must pay the sum of $5000.00 
to plaintiff if he was to take the home. 
We can see no justice in that. It may be further 
pointed out that the Court also made findings, findings 
No. 11 and 12, to the effect that all the allegations of 
the plaintiff's complaint were true which of course 
found that the home was worth but $2500·00. Why then 
should the defendant be forced to give $5000.00 in order 
to be-- awarded the place as found in finding No. 10 
point No.6. In this finding of the Court below that the 
home was worth $5000.00 it seems to us that the plaintiff 
had knowingly testified falsely as well as misstating the 
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value in her pleadings. It was evidently the plaintiff's 
purpose to so Inislead the Court in this Inatter that the 
Court could, without abuse of discretion, award the home 
to her and award to the defendant what was actually a-
warded him in the decree to wit, the bonds, face value of 
$1340.00, the car, value of $500.00 as found by the Court, 
hut which we offered to plaintiff in open Court for 
$200.00 and which she refused to take, and a few tools of 
practically no value. 
ARGUMENT 
Point No. 9 
\Ve believe the Court in its supplemental finding 
No. 13 to the effect that there were grounds for con-
donation of the plaintiff toward the defendant but if 
there ·were grounds for condonation (accepting the fact 
that there had been legal cruelty by the defendant to-
ward the plaintiff) then the Court erred in finding that 
defendant violated the terms of condonation in drink-
Ing and not providing himself with a job. 
As to alleged acts of cruelty we have already dis-
cussed that in points 3, 4, 7 and 8 and will not repeat. 
We have searched the record and fail to find any test-
inlony on respondent's part that appellant had been 
cruel to her within two years next prior to the bringing 
of these procedings or that he had been drinking or 
failed to do all in his power to contribute to the family. 
Respondent, as has been heretofore pointed out, testi-
fied that appellant had done all he could under his phy-
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sical handicaps (tr· 47. 48). And it n1ay be further noted 
that at the very time that plaintiff filed suit for divorce 
defendant was in :Montpelier working for the Deseret 
News, a job she had told hiln to stay with and not go 
to Hill Field or Second Street. (tr. 101, 96) This was 
was not denied by the plaintiff as far as we have 
been able to see by the record or remember from the 
trial. 
ARGUMENT 
Points 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 
In it's conclusion of law No. 1 (point No. 10) the 
Court found that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree 
of diYorce against the defendant and failed to find that 
the defendant was entitled to a decree against the 
plaintiff, and in it's conclusion of law No. 4 (point No. 
11) the Court found that unless the defendant had de-
posited the sum of $5000.00 with the Clerk of the Court 
by July 9th, 1951, that he should not be entitled to the 
home. 
In the Courts decree of divorce contained in para-
graph No. 1 (point 12) the Court below awarded the 
decree of divorce to plaintiff as against the defend-
ant and failed to award the decree in favor of the de-
fendant and appellant. And in paragraph 6, 7, and 8 
of said decree (points 13. and 14) the Court respectively 
awarded the home to plaintiff and ordered the appel-
lant to leave said home by July 9th, 1951 or the Court 
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would issue a writ of possession in favor of the plain-
tiff. 
We urge that the Court erred in all these matters 
and say, that in our opinion, the decree should have 
been awarded to the defendant on the grounds of cruelty. 
In support of this we direct the Court's attention to 
our stateinent of the evidence and the transcription of 
the same and further urge in argument the argument 
put forth in support of our points 3, 4, 7, and 8, which 
we believe shows no legal cruelty toward the plaintiff 
by defendant but just the reverse and show that it was 
plaintiff who was guilty of the acts of cruelty toward 
the defendant. 
In regards to the disposition of the property of 
tl1e parties we feel, too, that it was inequitable for the 
plaintiff in this case to receive 3 times as much property 
as the defendant It will be noted that the property 
was acctunulated from the joint efforts of the parties, 
the defendant contributing no less than the plaintiff 
even though he was disabled to such an extent as would 
have discouraged many persons in like circumstances 
from making any effort toward earning any income 
at all. That his disabilities were known and fully ap-
preciated by the plaintiff is admitted by the plaintiff 
as heretofore shown and she had no right to assume 
and she did not assume that the defendant would be able 
to wholly support a family, that she would have to lend 
a substantial supporting hand in making a living. And 
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also, a~ stated before and as proved by the record, as 
has also been pointed out, plaintiff adn1itted that defend-
ant had done all he could do under his n1any disabilities, 
and that he, in order to obtain son1e work had to sign a 
waiver that if he was injured that no claim would be 
made for insurance. etc. (tr. 91) 
May we now again draw this Court's attention to 
a most peculiar finding or findings of the Court below 
in finding that the car in question, and which was award-
ed to defendant, was worth $500.00 as alleged and test-
ified to by the plaintiff even though the defendant in 
open Court offered her the same for $200.00, and the 
further finding of the Court that the home was worth 
the sum of $5000.00, the amount the defendant testified 
to as being it's worth, and not the sum of $2500.00, the 
sum alleged in plaintiff's pleading and so testified to in 
open Court by her. The Court further made the find-
ing that if defendant would pay to plaintiff the su1n 
of $5000.00 that he could have the home. In this con-
nection it should be remembered that in open Court we 
offered plaintiff the sum she both alleged and testified 
to as to what the home was worth. May we not then 
well ask: why should the Court take the value of the 
automobile as set by the plaintiff and not by the de-
fendant, and two, why should the Court take the value 
of the home as set by the defendant, to-wit, the sum 
of $5000.00 and not the value as set by the plaintiff 
at $2500.00, a value she knew well, in our opinion to be 
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false. And, too, if she swore falsely in this matter did 
she not do so in other matters and particularly in re-
gards to the alleged cruelty of the defendant toward her 
and this all the more so when she had no corraborating 
witness or witnesses~ 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we urge that the Decree of Divorce 
that the Court below awarded to the plaintiff be set 
aside and a Decree be awarded to defendant and counter-
claimant, and further, that this Court set aside the 
award of the home to the plaintiff and allow the defend-
ant the right to pay to plaintiff the sum of $2500·00 
in lieu thereof or in the alternative, if this Court sees 
fit, that plaintiff keep the home upon payment to de-
fendant the sum of at least $1500.00. Of course this 
$1500.00 is in addition to what Court below awarded 
defendant-
Respectfully submitted, 
HARVEY A. SJOSTROM 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
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